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Introduction 
 
The topic of this Bachelor´s thesis is Russia and European Energy Security. The 
main field of the topic is Energy industry and its security aspects, specifically 
Natural gas logistics. The paper will cover different aspects of Russia-EU gas 
relations including geopolitics, history and current trends, logistical challenges; 
and new gas infrastructure projects led by the EU and Russia.  
 
The Energy field is not a new topic and it always presents the interest for many 
groups of individuals, international organizations and countries. Energy security 
has often been an issue in energy policy for the past 100 years. Especially now it 
is a high priority issue on the policy agenda in view of its significance for the 
whole economy of every country.  
 
Accordingly to ExxonMobil’s 2015 energy forecast natural gas will be the fuel 
with the highest demand growth, overtaking coal as the second most popular 
energy source with a 65% gain vs. its 2010 levels. Most gas exports would be 
accomplished via LNG shipments, which will triple, flowing to Asia and Europe 
from the Middle East and Russia. Most energy trade overall will follow these 
routes, as European and Asian production will fall far short of demand. North 
America is expected to produce enough liquids and gas to become a net 
exporter, while Latin America will produce slightly more liquids than it requires. 
Exports from Africa will go down as local demand rises. Russia will remain the 
world’s most abundant producer of gas, and oil surpluses will come from the 
Middle East and Russia. (Parekh Erin Nelson, 2015) 
 
Demand for natural gas is growing but unfortunately many questions related to 
energy security are still unclear from different prospective. This thesis aims to 
bring to light the current state of the EU-Russia energy relations. New gas 
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projected routes and the rationale behind them, including their economic viability 
and political motivations will be discussed. I intend to define the term Energy 
Security both for Russia and the EU, assess the EU actions towards improving its 
Energy Security and role of Russia in these processes. The paper attempts to 
explain the issue of EU Energy Security of supply of natural gas with a special 
focus on Russia underlying their mutual interdependence. Thus, main research 
questions are: Is Russia and its gas projects an answer to European Energy 
Security? What is the role of Ukraine and geopolitics in Energy Security? What 
are the prospects of the EU’s Energy Security diversification?  
 
This paper was conducted on the basis of reviewing numerous newspaper and 
magazine articles, legal acts and regulations issued by the EU and Russia, 
outlooks and surveys on the energy industry, publications of energy industry 
analysts, as well as official web sources of energy institutions and ongoing gas 
infrastructure projects. Many publications were found from The International 
Relations and Security Network1 (ISN ETH Zurich) which contains many articles 
and intergovernmental publications on energy matters. Due to the nature of the 
research work primarily a qualitative approach will be used to answer the 
research questions. In order to assess and understand nature of the EU-Russia 
energy relations several case studies will be done. According to Yin (2003) a case 
study is an appropriate research method when the author intends to answer 
“how” and “why” questions and cannot manipulate the behavior of those 
involved in the study.  
  
                                           
1 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/ 
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2. Energy security 
2.1 Energy Security definition 
 
Energy security becomes more and more of an issue in the face of worldwide 
increasing energy consumption, uncertainty about the stability of supply, prices 
of energy resources and delivery conditions. Especially in the light of recent 
events in Ukraine between 2006 and 2014 Energy Security has become an 
urgent matter that must be under constant scrutiny. Threats to Energy Security 
are mainly seen in political instabilities of energy exporting and transit countries, 
geostrategic and geopolitical factors, decreasing reserves of natural recourses 
and the infrastructure of the existing energy markets. 
 
The concept of Energy Security is not new and broadly defined in many scientific 
papers and legal acts. To my opinion the definition given by Cristian von 
Hirschhausen clearly describes the term “Energy Security”.  
 
Energy security can be defined as a state where the risks related to 
high dependence on energy imports, political instability in producing 
and/or transit countries, as well as of other adverse contingencies, are 
mastered at reasonable economic costs (von Hirschhausen C., 2005, p. 
2). 
 
Another definition of Energy Security which is done by The International Energy 
Agency (IEA) also emphasizes the importance of constant and reliable supply of 
energy resources (Figure 1).  
 
Energy Security is the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an 
affordable price. Energy security has many aspects: long-term energy 
security mainly deals with timely investments to supply energy in line 
with economic developments and environmental needs. On the other 
hand, short-term energy security focuses on the ability of the energy 
system to react promptly to sudden changes in the supply-demand 
balance (IEA, 2015).  
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Figure 1. Defining Energy Security .Source: (IEA, 2015).  
 
Figure 1 illustrates the IEA’s above-mentioned definition of Energy Security. 
Reliability, affordability and accessibility of supply are the main characteristics of 
Energy Security. Energy Security of a country is highly dependent on 
uninterrupted supply of energy resources. Key factors of stable and constant 
supply of such resources are political stability and affordable prices of resources. 
A country that produces and can utilize different energy resources has a high 
Energy Security. The same could be applied to a country that has an access to a 
number of reliable suppliers with well established logistics infrastructures. On 
contrary a country that uses suppliers with unreliable transit distribution points 
has lower security level. The World Energy Council (WEC) created a certain index 
of Energy Sustainability which is called “Energy Trilemma Index”. This Index 
ranks countries in terms of their ability to provide sustainable energy policies 
through the 3 dimensions of the energy trilemma: Energy Security, Energy 
Equity and Environmental Sustainability. WEC defines Energy Security as: 
 
Energy Security is the effective management of primary energy supply 
from domestic and external sources, the reliability of energy 
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infrastructure, and the ability of participating energy companies to meet 
current and future demand (World Energy Council, 2015). 
 
Thereby Canada, Russia, Qatar and the other 7 top countries have the highest 
Energy Security level mainly due their high level of energy production or low 
dependency on fuel exports (Figure 2). Even though Russia has an exceptional 
level of Energy Security its overall Trilemma index is quite low due to an average 
performance on energy equity (the accessibility and affordability of energy 
supply across the population), and a poor environmental sustainability ranking. 
On the other hand Switzerland maintains the highest overall Energy Trilemma 
index due to its high energy equity and ultra-low emission energy infrastructure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Top 10 Energy Trilemma Index performers overall and per dimension. Source: 
(Wyman Oliver, 2014, p.16). 
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In conclusion we can say that Energy Security is a complex term that has several 
peripheral dimensions in terms of energy equity, environmental issues, political 
and economical matters. Energy Security is an integral part of the internal and 
external policy of any country. The following two sections present the EU and 
Russian energy policies to provide an overview of the high importance of Energy 
Security and related matters. 
 
2.2 The EU Energy Policy 
 
Energy security has become an important policy area for the EU from the 2000s 
onwards. The main distinction in energy security concepts could be found 
between energy importing and exporting countries. The EU countries are mainly 
energy importing countries and they are naturally concerned about energy 
security of supply. The exporting countries are more concerned about the 
security of demand. Nevertheless many producing and exporting countries may 
also face energy disruptions of domestic supply what leads to domestic energy 
insecurity.  
 
There are two major types of risks need to be taken into account: source risks 
and transit risks. The EU’s leaders adopted an “Energy Policy for Europe” in 
March 2007 (Communication from the Commission to the European Council and 
the European Parliament - an energy policy for Europe, COM/2007/0001). The 
European energy policy is based on three-pillar strategy focusing on the 
competitiveness, security of supply and sustainability of energy. According to 
above mentioned legal act the main priorities for the EU are: minimizing the EU's 
vulnerability concerning imports, shortfalls in supply, possible energy crises and 
uncertainty with respect to future supplies. 
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The Energy Community Treaty (Council Decision 2006/500/EC of 29 May 2006 on 
the conclusion by the European Community of the Energy Community Treaty) 
provides for the creation of an integrated energy market (electricity and gas) 
between the European Community and the contracting parties. Other important 
legal acts of the EU are The Energy Charter Treaty and The Energy Charter 
Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects which were 
signed in December 1994 and entered into legal force in April 1998. The roots of 
the Energy Charter date back to a political initiative launched in Europe in the 
early 1990s. The collapse of the USSR resulted in devastating economic and 
social consequences in the countries of the former Soviet Union. Therefore gas 
transit risk was already evident, especially in Ukraine: with some supply 
reductions by Russia. At the end of the Cold War there was a need to overcome 
economic divisions especially in energy sector; for this and other reasons the 
Energy Charter process was initiated. Fifty-two European and Asian countries 
have signed or acceded to the Energy Charter Treaty. All EU states are individual 
signatories, but the Treaty has also been signed collectively by the European 
Community and Euratom so the total number of parties to the Treaty is fifty-four. 
Of these fifty-four, all have ratified the Treaty except for five: Australia, Belarus, 
Iceland, Norway and the Russian Federation. Belarus and Russia have accepted 
provisional application of the Treaty, which meant that - pending ratification. 
Russia and Belarus agreed to apply the Treaty to the extent that it was 
consistent with their own constitutions, laws and regulations. On 20 August 2009 
the Russian Federation has officially informed the Depository that it did not 
intend to become a Contracting Party to the Energy Charter Treaty. (Energy 
Charter, 2015) 
 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions 
of 10 November 2010 - Energy 2020, A Strategy for competitive, sustainable and 
secure energy (COM (2010) 639 final) sets out the European Commission’s 
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energy strategy in the period to 2020. The strategy is structured around 5 
priorities: 
 limiting energy use in Europe; 
 building a pan-European integrated energy market; 
 empowering consumers and achieving the highest level of safety and 
security; 
 extending Europe’s leadership in the development of energy technology 
and innovation; 
 strengthening the external dimension of the EU energy market. 
 
The list of the EU’s legal acts is huge and it mainly concerns field of 
sustainability, the implementation of a common energy market and a common 
energy security policy. But the barriers to the realization of a common energy 
security policy remain formidable. Some member states of the EU concern about 
transferring their sovereignty to the EU Commission. It could be explained by the 
fact that energy is a major domestic policy issue and a prerequisite for national 
economic growth. Additionally the consumption of energy varies considerably in 
each individual member state thus it is difficult for them to speak with one voice 
regarding the EU Energy policy. There is a fundamental conflict between the 
goals of energy security and the desire to create a competitive market – without 
centralized coordination. Thus, the energy security is likely difficult to achieve 
without balanced Energy policy.  
 
In Europe, Energy politics constitute a solid economic and political challenge. The 
gas supplies to Europe are made according to agreements between gas 
supplying and gas transit countries. This system is not fully secure and 
vulnerable to disruption and gas ‘wars’ or crises. The Ukraine gas crises in 2006, 
2009 and 2014 were real threats to energy security in the EU. A strong 
geopolitical tension between Russia and the West over Ukraine in 2014 has 
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forced gas importers in Europe to rethink their energy policies. Furthermore in 
2007 the EU signed the so-called Third Energy Package (TEP) that outlines a set 
of rules regulating the European gas and electricity market. TEP aims at 
increasing competition on the energy market, allowing other players to join the 
sector and liberalizing energy prices. This Package consists of two Directives 
(Directive 2009/72/EC, Directive 2009/73/EC) and three Regulations (Regulation 
(EC) No 714/2009, Regulation (EC) No 715/2009, Regulation (EC) No 713/2009). 
(European Commission, 2015) One of the core elements of TEP prohibits a single 
company from both owning and operating a gas pipeline and contains rules on 
third party access to the natural oil transportation grid. 
 
2.3 Russian Energy Policy 
 
Oil and gas producing/exporting countries like Russia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and others are mainly concerned about the security of demand. For such 
countries energy exports present the essential part of their revenues, thus the 
security of demand is a big issue for them. Besides, disequilibrium, or a shock, in 
energy prices may create instability. For Russia, a producer state, energy security 
has a different meaning, which stipulates security of demand, emphasizing 
greater access to markets and consumers (Yergin, 2006, p.77). Control of 
pipelines is a major matter for Russia. It is therefore not surprising that Russia 
chose not to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty mentioned above. The ratification 
of it will give the Energy Treaty Community the possibility to regulate transit 
issues and thus access to export pipeline networks under the principles of 
freedom of transit and non-discrimination. 
 
Marshall Goldman, the author of the book “Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the 
New Russia” describes Russia as an energy superpower. Goldman calls Russian 
natural gas its New Secret Weapon. It is difficult to disagree with those 
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statements. Russia holds the largest natural gas reserves in the world (See 
Figure 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Top Gas Producing countries 2015, Source World Energy Council, 2015 
[Online]. 
 
After the fall of the Soviet Union, the Kremlin no longer had the option of using 
military power to maintain its interests abroad. Therefore, Russia had to find 
another way to protect its interests. The Kremlin has gained control of Gazprom 
in order to render Gazprom’s gas products as a tool to enforce Kremlin policies 
abroad. 
 
In September 2005, Vladimir Putin, president of Russia, utilized the Kremlin’s 
stake in Gazprom to enlarge the Kremlin’s ownership of the Russian oil industry 
(Goldman, 2008, p.146). Currently the state-run Gazprom produces about 80% 
of Russia’s total natural gas output. Gazprom controls more than 65% of Russia’s 
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proved gas reserves. Additionally Gazprom has control over Russia’s natural gas 
pipeline systems.  
 
Vladimir Putin quickly admitted the importance of energy as a political tool. Mr. 
Putin also made it clear, by breaking up the well-known Yukos oil company and 
imprisoning its chief executive, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, that he would allow no 
one to challenge his authority. History evidences many examples of how Mr. 
Putin and Kremlin used natural gas as a political tool. In the fourth quarter of 
2008, Armenia and Belarus paid the lowest prices (US$110 and US$128 per 1000 
m3 respectively), while Moldova and Georgia bought their gas at the highest 
prices (US$287.60 and US$235 respectively). Obtaining lower gas prices usually 
requires some concessions to be made to Russia. In the case of Armenia, 
Gazprom took control over strategic assets in the energy sector (the ArmRosGaz 
company, practically all gas infrastructures in the country, and the fifth block of 
the Razdan power plant), in the aftermath of the signature of a three-year gas 
deal in April 2006. (Loskot-Strachota, 2009, p.20) 
 
Recent Russia-Ukraine conflicts confirm the strong political rationale behind the 
deals. Usually after gas conflicts Russia increases the gas price for Ukraine 
dramatically. Such fluctuations in prices do not sound like economically rational 
decisions, more like political ones. Russia desires to transport gas through 
Ukrainian infrastructure to Europe at the lowest rates possible. In order to reach 
this goal Russia may imply higher gas prices to influence Ukrainian politics. At 
the same time Ukraine as well wants to have highest transit fees from Russia. 
Thus, both Russia and Ukraine hold strategic economic weapons against each 
other. If Ukraine fails to pay its gas debts or its diplomacy becomes too Western 
(Viktor Yushchenko presidency, Petro Poroshenko presidency - since 2014), 
Russia may stop deliveries of gas to Ukraine, as it did in 2006 and 2009, 
damaging both Ukraine’s and Russia’s economies. These 2006 and 2009 gas 
crises can hurt the Russian government economically, humiliate Russia politically, 
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and damage its reputation in Europe as a stable source of supply. And the worst 
scenarios that may dramatically disrupt both supply and demand of natural gas 
are military conflicts, geopolitical confrontations between Russia and Ukraine, 
overall world political tension and western sanctions against Russia. 
 
In light of such strong political instability the EU and Russia should clearly 
understand the consequences of possible supply disruptions as some European 
countries entirely rely on Russia gas. This dependence leaves them vulnerable to 
supply disruptions. Thus Russia has been trying to implement different gas 
projects to diversify the routes for supplying Russian natural gas to European 
countries.  
 
 
2.4 Dependency and Vulnerability 
 
Russia remains an important trade partner for the EU, and vice versa. Russia 
holds the world’s largest natural gas reserves (See Appendix A) and EU member 
states are the premier destination of Russian energy resources. Russia and the 
European Union are interdependent in terms of their energy policies. The EU is 
highly dependent on gas energy from imports by a factor of 65.8% in 2012 
(Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. EU 27 Energy Import Dependency by Fuel. Source: European Commission. 
(2014), p.24. 
 
Energy dependency strongly differs among EU member states. Among its 
member states, only Denmark and the Netherlands presented exporting activity. 
In 2012, their natural gas dependency rates were minus 54.2 % and minus 74.5 
% respectively (See Appendix B). The United Kingdom, a net exporter until 2003, 
became an importer with a dependency rate that reached 44.2 % in 2011. In 
2012, the lowest dependency rates were recorded in Romania (21.2 %) and 
Croatia (37 %) while Finland, Estonia, Sweden and many other EU countries 
were 100 % dependent on gas imports. (European Commission, 2014, p.72) 
 
Russia is the principal EU supplier with a 32 % share of total natural gas imports 
in 2012 followed by Norway with a 31 % share (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. EU imports of Natural Gas by country of origin 2012. Source: (European 
Commission, 2014, p.26). 
 
If alternative energy sources would not be implemented in the nearest future the 
overall dependence on energy imports is expected to grow, according to EU 
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forecasts (Figure 6) and international predictions made by the International Gas 
Union, in addition to forecasts of The Energy Research Institute of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences and Analytical Center for the Government of the Russian 
Federation (See Appendix C).  
 
The EU predicts that because of “its green properties” and highly efficient 
application technologies, natural gas will remain the fuel of choice and will 
continue to make a growing contribution to the energy supply in the EU 
countries. Natural gas consumption in the EU is expected to increase from 438 
mtoe in 2005 to 625 mtoe2 in 2030, which is an increase of 43% (Figure 6). The 
share of natural gas in the European primary energy demand will rise from 24% 
in 2005 to 30% in 2030 (18% in 1990). (Eurogas , 2010, p.3) At 60% of the 
total demand increase, most of the growth will come from power generation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. EU 27 Natural Gas Demand outlook by sector. Source: Eurogas (2010), p.3. 
 
The high level of mutual dependency obliges both Russia and the EU to promote 
a respectful relationship. The EU and USSR conducted quite stable energy 
import-export relations even during the period the Cold War. The Russian-
                                           
2 Million Tonnes of Oil Equivalent. The tonne of oil equivalent (toe) is a unit of energy: 
the amount of energy released by burning one tonne of crude oil, approximately 42 GJ 
(joules). Source: American Physical Society. (2015). 
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Ukrainian gas disputes of 2006, 2009 and 2014 have served as accelerator for 
building up new energy relations. Additionally, these events produced a new 
degree of concern that Russia is becoming an unreliable supplier or is using its 
energy products as political weapon.  
 
Nonetheless, both sides are trying to build respectful relationship concerning 
energy security. On the occasion of the sixth EU-Russia Summit (30th October 
2000, Paris), it was agreed to institute an Energy Dialogue on a regular basis 
between the EU and Russia to enable progress in mutual cooperation. The last 
(8th) Energy Dialogue meeting of the EU-Russia Gas Advisory Council took place 
on 19 November 2013 in Brussels (European Commission, 2015). The overall 
objective of the energy partnership was to enhance the energy security of the 
European continent by binding Russia and the EU into a closer relationship.  
 
The EU-Russia energy relationships are complicated due to the fact that not all 
EU members are equally dependent on Russian gas. We can clearly see that not 
all countries have the same concern towards Energy policy: For example, Finland 
is fully dependent on Russian gas; Spain receives none (Figure 7). 
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Figure 7. European Gas Imports from Russia by Country as Percentage of Total 
Consumption. Source: BP 2010. Global Statistical Review of World Energy. 
 
It is also important to mention that some European state-owned companies aim 
to invest in Russia. Thus Moscow implements different rules when it deals with 
different states. One of Russia’s top priorities has been the promotion of two 
major pipeline projects such as North Stream and South Stream. Moscow made 
deals with major German energy companies and secured the services of former 
German Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, as chief lobbyist. Schröder was 
determined to press ahead with Nord Stream - German energy security was too 
important, despite the cost. With the South Stream project, Mr. Putin made deals 
with Austria, Bulgaria and Greece, as well as Turkmenistan, with the aim of 
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sabotaging the EU-preferred Nabucco pipeline. Therefore the Polish defence 
minister went so far as to compare a planned German-Russian gas pipeline to 
the 1939 Nazi-Soviet Pact partitioning Poland. (Beck J., 2006)  
 
Energy relations between the EU and Russia cannot be solely built on commercial 
relations. , The overview of the previous chapters proves that politics and 
individual countries’ interests are of high importance and many EU governments 
can find themselves coming under pressure from Russia.  
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3. European Energy Logistics 
3.1 Gas infrastructure and Supply chain 
 
A large proportion of natural gas needs to be transported from the producing 
countries to the consuming countries. International high pressure pipelines are 
fast transporters of the natural gas. They provide direct and reliable links from 
producers to consumers. Another mean of the gas transportation is gas 
liquefaction. Gas liquefaction makes natural gas easier to transport by ship or by 
road in tankers to the market where it is then degasified (Figure 8). Liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) has become as important as pipelines as a mean of 
international delivery of natural gas. Figure 8 is a simple illustration of the main 
components of the Natural gas value chain. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 Gas Value Chain. Source: (WEC, 2013, p.116). 
 
In Europe, indigenous resources currently satisfy about half of the gas demand. 
The largest European producers are Norway (105 bcm), the Netherlands (88 
bcm) and the UK (60bcm). Europe is, and will remain, by far the largest net 
importer; European net imports could exceed 440 bcm by 2030, a 58% increase 
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compared to 2010 levels. Europe exports only small amounts of LNG from 
Snovhit in Norway. (WEC, 2013) 
 
Europe receives natural gas from various sources, either by pipeline or in the 
form of LNG. As it was mentioned in the previous paragraph Russia is the main 
exporter of natural gas to Europe. After Russia, Norway is the second key natural 
gas supplier to the European region. Norwegian gas goes mainly to Germany, 
France and the UK. Around 81% of total imports to Europe come via pipelines. 
The other portion of Natural Gas comes as LNG from Algeria, Qatar, Nigeria, 
Egypt, and Trinidad & Tobago. For example, the UK, Italy, and Spain are the 
main importers of LNG from Qatar while France, Spain, and Turkey are the main 
buyers of Nigerian gas. (Niftiyev Efgan, 2013) 
 
From the previous chapter we have learnt that over the next two decades, the 
total natural gas import demand in Europe may increase. It obliges Europe to 
think about additional supply and diversification. Besides the EU learnt in 2006, 
2009 and 2014 how disputes in gas relations between Russia and Ukraine may 
influence the security stability of European gas market.  
 
 
3.2 Transit countries and geopolitics 
 
Russia’s energy relations with the EU have created strong interdependence 
between the two counterparts - the EU needs Russian natural gas, and Russia 
depends on access to the EU energy market. But besides the EU and Russia 
there are other important players of EU-Russia gas relations - transit countries. 
Energy flows from Russia to Europe involves land transit countries like Ukraine 
and Belarus, and this attract great attention since the fall of the Soviet Union. 
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There are two major pipeline systems that carry Russian gas through Ukraine to 
Western Europe - the Bratstvo (Brotherhood) and Soyuz (Union) pipelines 
(Figure 9). The Bratstvo pipeline is Russia's largest pipeline to Europe. It crosses 
from Ukraine to Slovakia and splits in two to supply northern and southern 
European countries. The Soyuz pipeline links Russian pipelines to natural gas 
networks in Central Asia and supplies additional volumes to central and northern 
Europe. A third major pipeline through Ukraine (Trans-Balkan) delivers Russian 
natural gas to the Balkan countries and Turkey (US EIA, 2015). 
 
In the past, as much as 80% of Russian natural gas exports to Europe transited 
Ukraine. This number has fallen to 50%-60% since the Nord Stream pipeline was 
built. The Nord Stream is a direct link between Russia and Germany under the 
Baltic Sea, and came online in 2011. The Nord Stream route crosses the 
Exclusive Economic Zones of Russia, Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Germany, 
as well as the territorial waters of Russia, Denmark, and Germany. (Nord Stream, 
2015) This project is a good example of a constructive mutual cooperation in the 
sphere of Energy Security as the Nord Stream definitely reinforces security of 
supply bypassing Ukraine. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Major natural gas transit pipelines flowing trough Ukraine. Source: US EIA, 
2015 
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Currently 16% of Russian natural gas consumed in Europe flows via Ukraine (US 
EIA, 2015). It means that if Russia constitutes 32% (see Figure 5) of overall 
Europe gas consumption, half of the supplies from Russian side are subject to 
transit risks. Especially the last 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis has contributed to 
severely damaging relations between the EU and Russia and the rest of the 
western world. 
 
Since the Ukraine Revolution February 2014 (the so-called Euromaidan 
Revolution) all transits via Ukraine have become a problematic issue. The 
Euromaidan Revolution resulted in civil war, Ukraine split and severe 
confrontation broke out between Eastern Ukraine and the Kiev authorities. 
Moreover after a referendum in March 2014 Crimea became the part of the 
Russian Federation. The referendum was not recognized as a legal act by the EU, 
USA and the rest of the world. Only several friendly to Russia countries such as 
Kazakhstan, Armenia, Argentina, Cuba, Venezuela, Abkhazia and few others 
accepted the referendum as legal. Assuming the fact that Russia has been de 
facto at war with Ukraine since Russian activity in Crimea, and its direct or 
indirect support to the anti-Kyiv armed rebellion in Donbas Energy Security of the 
EU become under extremely high risk. There is a real danger that gas suppliers 
can be disrupted as happened in 2006 and 2009 due to lack of agreement on 
debt and pricing issues. Civil war in Ukraine may lead to physical disruption of 
gas supplies what could be even more problematic than gas price negotiations.  
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union Ukraine has used its strategic transit 
position to negotiate low gas prices. It was a mutual balance of fair gas price for 
Ukraine and low transit costs for Russia but only until the gas crises of 2006 and 
2009 when Ukraine siphoned off gas intended for the European market. 
Ukraine’s suspicious activities and its unwillingness to pay debts in time led 
Russia to rethink its energy security activities. Russia focused on the tactic of 
removing transit risks by implementation of new pipeline routes. Russia already 
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completed several projects: the Yamal Europe pipeline, the Blue Stream pipeline, 
the Nord Stream line across the Baltic Sea and few others under construction 
processes (Figure 10). And until recently by creating a new line through the 
Black Sea (The South Stream) Russia aimed to finally free Russia of its reliance 
on a potentially disruptive neighbor Ukraine. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Gazprom pipelines. Source: Gazprom (2015). 
 
Thus the Russian-Ukrainian crisis of February 2014 has boosted the issue of 
Energy Security both in the EU political agenda and the Russian one. Eventually, 
on May 2014 the EU published its new European Energy Security Strategy. The 
Strategy aims to ensure a stable and abundant supply of energy for European 
citizens and the economy. The EU published “Short term measures for winter 
2014-2015” in case of a complete halt of Russian gas imports to the EU or in 
case of a disruption of Russian gas imports through the Ukrainian transit route 
(European Commission, 2015). But short term measures may not resolve the 
long-term issue. Supplier and route diversification is needed to overcome the low 
energy security level.  
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4. Diversification of Gas routes in Europe 
4.1 Overview of competing pipeline projects 
 
In order to increase Energy Security level the EU should reduce its energy import 
dependency by the means of internal measures, such as adapting the energy mix 
towards alternative and renewable sources, increasing energy efficiency, 
reducing consumption and diversification of new gas routes. The necessity to 
find an alternative to Russian Natural gas was the main factor that forced 
Eastern and Central European states to start the cooperation with the South 
Caucasus. As it was mentioned before the need for alternative sources became 
especially visible after gas crises of 2006 and 2009, when supplies to several 
Eastern and Central European countries were disrupted because of gas price 
conflicts between Ukraine and Russia. The European Commission decided to add 
the Fourth Corridor or the Southern Gas Corridor to the three existing gas 
corridors. From its inception, this project sought to take natural gas from the 
Azeri field Shah-Deniz 2 (Sartori Nicolo, 2012, p.3). There are several competing 
players within the Southern Gas Corridor project, presenting different interests 
and not all of them supported by the EU. The Southern Gas Corridor initially 
included three main pipelines: the Interconnector Turkey-Greece-Italy Pipeline 
(ITGI), the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) and the Nabucco pipeline. Another 
possible pipeline in the Southern Corridor until recently was the Russian project - 
the South Stream (Figure 11). 
 
The Nabucco project was the main competitor of the Russian South Stream 
Project. The South Stream was actually a reflexive project, as it was designed 
right after the EU announced its desire to build a direct Caspian Sea-Middle East-
EU southern gas corridor, primarily through the Nabucco pipeline. Nabucco was 
planned to be a 3,300km natural gas pipeline project through which it was 
intended to bring up to 31 billion cubic meters annually of Central Asian gas from 
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the eastern end of Turkey, across Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary into Austria 
by 2020. Construction was expected to begin in 2008 and finished in 2011-2013. 
It was designed to bypass Russia to transport gas to Central Europe. For these 
reasons this pipeline had a substantial geopolitical significance, and was strongly 
supported by the EU. But the project had encountered financial problems and 
lack of political will in some member states, particularly Hungary, which in March 
2007 announced that it had agreed to a Russian proposed extension of the Blue 
Stream pipeline project instead (Borisocheva, 2007, p.14). Eventually in 2012 the 
Nabucco consortium decided to downsize its project into a Nabucco West 
pipeline with a capacity of 16 bcm - just over half the capacity of the originally 
planned 31 bcm pipeline - due to high construction costs and the lack of gas 
suppliers (Figure 12). Figure 12 represents new-formed players of the Southern 
Gas Corridor. The “Nabucco classic” project turned into two compatible pipeline 
projects. These are the Trans Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), which would carry 
Azerbaijani gas through Turkish territory, and Nabucco West, which would 
continue gas transportation through the European sector. 
 
Another pipeline mentioned by the European Commission was the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP). In 2012, the TAP pipeline was competing with Nabucco West for 
the gas from Azerbaijan. If constructed, TAP, will ship 10 bcm of gas per year, 
with the option to increase the capacity up to 20 bcm. It will run through Greece 
and Albania, under the Adriatic Sea to southern Italy. The construction of TAP 
would provide the countries involved in this project, such as Greece and Albania, 
with a large inflow of foreign direct investment and foster economic growth 
(Kusznir Julia, 2013, p.3). On 13 February 2013 the countries involved in TAP, 
Albania, Greece and Italy, signed a tri-lateral intergovernmental agreement 
which reinforced their full political support for this project. Currently there are 
several problems with TAP project. The gas connectors between the countries 
involved in this pipeline are under development, so it will take time until the TAP 
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will be constructed. The project needs additional investments. Greece’s current 
financial problems are still unresolved, so there are no guarantees that the 
project will start in time. The project is currently in its implementation phase and 
is preparing for construction of the pipeline, which is planned to begin in 2016. 
(TAP, 2015) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Projected pipelines in the Southern Gas Corridor. Source: CSS Zurich. (2008), 
p.2. 
 
The Nabucco West project envisaged the construction of a pipeline from the 
Turkish–Bulgarian border to Austria through Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. It 
was initially proposed to carry 10 bcm of Azerbaijani gas annually and later 16 
bcm (Kusznir Julia.2013, p.3). 
 
The main dilemma or task for Azerbaijan was to choose the best alternative. It 
was up to Azerbaijan and the Azeri Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC) to decide 
which gas export route from TANAP to Europe to use.  
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Figure 12. New Players of the Southern Gas Corridor in 2012. Source :Neftegas, 2013.  
 
 
4.2 Case Analysis: TAP Vs. Nabucco West 
 
SDC had to choose between two options and probably the decision was made 
after assessing the following areas of each project: market opportunities, timing, 
scalability, capacity, management operability, funding availability, project quality 
and political issues.  For better understanding of each project I built the table 
with the main features of each project (Table 13). 
 
  
                                           
3 The Table was constructed by the author in 2013 by the means of the following 
sources: TAP, 2013 [Online] and Sobjak, (2012). TAP 2015 presents new figures for 
certain categories (see TAP, 2015 source). Decision by SDC was made in 2013 thus I 
decided to leave the table as it was in 2013.  
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Table.1 Key Features of Nabucco West and TAP (2013)  
Key Features Nabucco West TAP 
Length 1329 km 867 km 
Capacity 10-23 bcma 10-20 bcma 
Estimated cost 2.7 bilion $ 1.5 billion $ 
Construction to begin 2013 2013 
Gas to be delivered 
by 
2018 2019 
Transit Countries Bulgaria, Romania, 
Hungary (Austria) 
Greece, Albania, (Italy) 
Partners and owners OMV (24%), MOL 
(17%), Transgaz 
(17%), Bulgargaz 
(17%), BOTAŞ(17%), 
GDF (9%) 
BP (20%), SOCAR (20%), 
Statoil (20%), Fluxys (16%), 
Total (10%), E.ON (9%), 
Axpo (5%) 
Source: Author’s own construction. 
 
A short summary evidences that TAP had few economic advantages over 
Nabucco West as the estimated costs were almost half less - 1.5 billion $. In 
economic terms, TAP had the whip hand. With a similar capacity, TAP’s 
estimated construction costs were lower and thus this project was more 
economically viable than Nabucco West. The main reason behind it was the 
shorter route of the project. TAP’s main destination market is Italy, where 
natural gas is sold at a higher price than in Austria4. In political terms, TAP had 
also more advantages than Nabucco West. TAP had stronger governmental 
support from the transit countries than Nabucco. Nabucco West generated a 
strong rivalry with Russia and Gazprom in particular; TAP had generated fewer 
concerns in Russia. TAP had better relations with Russia which is a strategic 
                                           
4 http://www.fuel-prices-europe.info 
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partner of Azerbaijan. Moscow never made a secret of its aversion to the 
Nabucco project. In order to avoid EU-Azerbaijan energy cooperation, in 2010 
the Kremlin made a strategic proposal to purchase the total volume of Azeri gas 
at European market prices, asking nothing in exchange (Mikhelidze, 2013, p.4). 
Thus, we can assume that TAP was less seen by Gazprom as competitor while it 
remained physically within the EU’s borders.  
 
Nabucco project was originally born as a megaproject: very ambitious, with a 
large budget and high political goals to decrease dependency on Russian Gas. 
Financial and political constraints downsized the project dramatically from 
Nabucco Classic to Nabucco West. For Russia in 2013, the main purpose of the 
South Stream gas pipeline project was to prevent Nabucco and TGI from 
transporting Caspian gas directly to European market. 
 
Nabucco West and the EU itself undermined the importance of alliances and 
common interests. Nabucco was mostly a Central and Eastern European project 
ruled by OMV5 (Austria’s leading oil company). The Austrian company was 
competing against BP6 and Statoil7, respectively one of biggest national oil 
companies. Opposite, TAP was able to establish close alliances with key players 
prior to SDC’s final decision. TAP partnered with TANAP and therefore with its 
main shareholder, the State Oil Company of the Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR), 
which was also the owner of 10% of SDC. Thus, in political terms Nabucco West 
was very weak even though from very beginning it had strong EU and US 
support.  
 
                                           
5 http://www.omv.com 
6 BP - British Petroleum is one of the world's leading international oil and gas companies. 
Http://www.bp.com 
7 Statoil - Norwegian leading energy company in oil and gas production. 
http://www.statoil.com 
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The game between TAP and supported by the EU project Nabucco West was 
over in 2013. On 28 June 2013 Azeri Shah Deniz Consortium (SDC) made a 
historic decision that put an end to a long race initiated by the EU to decrease 
dependency on Russian gas (TAP, 2015).  
 
In conclusion we can say that Nabucco’s biggest rival seemed to be Gazprom’s 
South Stream but eventually, Nabucco West was not beaten by Russia but by its 
inability to secure a gas source (Azerbaijan). Nabucco West managed to bring 
together different governments of the transit countries but failed to unite its 
interests with the Azerbaijani government and SOCAR or other members of SDC, 
including BP and Statoil. Thus TAP was able to succeed where Nabucco failed. 
Eventually not only commercial advantages of TAP but political one made TAP 
more attractive choice.  
 
For its part by the time 2013 the EU was not able to remain a credible actor in 
the region, defend its interests by diversifying energy supplies. Azerbaijan’s 
decision to select TAP was favorable for Russia. In 2013 Gazprom got a chance 
to develop its South stream project until the EU introduced a new Energy 
Security Strategy (implementation of TEP) promoting strict competition in the 
Gas market. 
 
4.2 The South Stream Project 
 
According to official Gazprom website (2015) the South Stream project was 
primarily aimed at strengthening European energy security. The major objective 
of the South Stream project was meeting Europe’s additional demand for natural 
gas and ensuring a direct connection between suppliers and consumers thus 
raising significantly both Russian Energy Security and European one. By 
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implementing this project Russia could eliminate transit risks and build strong 
energy relations with Europe.  
 
The South Stream pipeline was one of Gazprom’s largest and most expensive 
infrastructural projects. The project envisaged the construction of a gas pipeline 
with a total length of approximately 2,385 km (a 930 km maritime section and 
1,455 km onshore in Europe) and an annual capacity of 63 bcm, which would 
run from Russian gas via the Black Sea to Central and South-Eastern Europe (see 
Figure 13). According to this scenario, South Stream with full capacity of 63 bcm 
per year could have a significant impact on European Energy Security. The first 
gas had to be supplied via South Stream in late 2015 reaching its full capacity in 
2018. 
 
Between 2008 – 2010 years, Russia signed intergovernmental agreements with 
transit countries: Bulgaria - January 18, 2008; Serbia - January 25, 2008; 
Hungary - February 28, 2008; Greece - April 29, 2008; Slovenia - November 14, 
2009; 
Croatia - March 2, 2010; Austria - April 24, 2010 (Gazprom, 2015). 
 
All signed intergovernmental agreements and in particular the Nabucco’s failure 
highly inspired Gazprom to continue its efforts to build the South Stream gas 
pipeline. From very beginning the South Stream project comprised of several 
joint companies set up for the project implementation purposes (Figure 13). In 
September 2011 the Shareholders Agreement of the South Stream Transport 
B.V. (offshore sector) was signed for the construction of the offshore gas 
pipeline section. The South Stream Transport B.V originally was a joint venture 
of Gazprom (a 50 % stake in the project), Italian Eni (a 20 % stake), German 
Wintershall Holding (a 15% stake) and French EDF (a 15% stake). 
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Figure 13. South Stream Gas pipeline. Source (Gazprom, 2015).  
 
In December 2012 the South Stream gas pipeline construction started near 
Anapa in the Krasnodar Territory. On October 31, 2013 the first joint was welded 
at South Stream's Bulgarian section near the Rasovo CS site. On November 24, 
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2013 the construction of South Stream's Serbian section started in the vicinity of 
Sajkas village, South Backa District. On December 29, 2013 Gazprom entered 
into agreements with Eni, Wintershall and EDF on purchasing 50 per cent of total 
shares in South Stream Transport from them. (Gazprom, 2015) 
 
The South Stream project was by far the largest ongoing Russian-European gas 
infrastructure project until its cancellation in December 2014. Eventually the 
signed agreement, launched constructions, sunk costs did not save the project. 
From the very beginning the South Stream Project was not simply a commercial 
one. As mentioned in previous chapters, Russia sees its natural resources as a 
political tool. Russia’s decision to cancel construction of the South Stream 
pipeline stipulates a significant change in Russian security strategy. The rationale 
behind the decision will be presented in the next section.  
 
 
4.3 Case Study: From South stream to Turkish stream 
4.3.1 Case overview 
 
The case study “From South stream to Turkish stream” represents an 
interpretation of a recent significant change in European-Russian Energy 
relations. This case study offers possible reasons and consequences of the 
cancellation of the South Stream project and Russia’s reorientation in its Energy 
Strategy. Policy transformations and prospects of the future developments both 
of EU and Russia energy security will be presented at the end of the case study. 
Analysis presented in this section is mainly based on recent geopolitical and 
economic events, with no claim to their dogmatic final certainty. I believe that 
energy relations present a long-term geopolitical game which could change any 
practical implementation issues overnight.  
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Russia’s decision to cancel such a huge ongoing project with a history of 8 years 
was a big surprise not only for Europe but as well for the rest of the world 
including Russian politicians, entrepreneurs and scientists. As it was mentioned in 
previous chapters until recently the main Russian Security Strategy stipulated the 
diversification of routes for supplying Russian natural gas to European countries. 
The main aim of this diversification was the elimination of the unreliable transit 
partner - Ukraine. Especially in the face of numerous Russian-Ukraine gas 
disputes energy security has become a complex issue requiring a combined 
group of actions in order to prevent or minimize Energy Security risks. It was 
planned to build the South Stream pipeline and stop the transit deals with 
Ukraine close to 2019. Moreover it was recently confirmed in April 2015 by the 
Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak that Russia would not extend gas the 
transit agreement with Ukraine which was signed in 2009 for the period of 10 
years (Soldatkin, 2015). Therefore the decision to stop the South Stream project 
did not mean that Russia decided to fold its hands and accept the EU political 
pressure.  
 
Russia openly announced that it would reach its Energy Security goals regardless 
all constraints. Russia showed that it values Europe as a gas market but at the 
same time does not want to dance to the EU’s tune. In early December 2014 
Gazprom cancelled the South Stream project and made it clear that 
diversification of the gas supplies will be done by other means, implementing 
other gas routes. Right after closure of the South Stream project Gazprom CEO 
Alexey Miller announced that European companies should themselves take over 
responsibility for the delivery of Russian gas from the Turkish border to the end 
consumer according to the Third Energy Package. Miller also stressed that 
Russia’s Energy Strategy had changed: 
 
The principle of our strategy in relation to the European market is 
changing. The decision on stopping South Stream is the beginning of an 
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end of our operation model on the market, within which we oriented 
ourselves toward supplying [gas] to the end consumer on the European 
market. …But you can't win love by force. If the buyer doesn't want the 
purchase to be delivered home, well, then perhaps he needs to get 
dressed and go to the store, and if it happens in winter, get dressed 
warmer. Well, he could also take some package, of course, which can 
well be the Third Energy Package, but what counts most is that it 
should not be empty. In our case, the store is certainly the delivery 
point" on the Turkish-Greek border (Interfax, 2014). 
  
Probably TEP was one of the main reasons behind the South Stream 
cancellation. The implementation of the TEP by the European Commission in 
2011 meant a significant shift in Russia’s traditional gas business model. The 
main provisions of TEP were presented in the second Chapter (see section 2.2 
The EU Energy Policy). This TEP raised a lot of disputes between Russia and the 
EU in terms of the gas diversification matters. It is important to mention that TEP 
came into force in 2011 when Russia already had gas diversification agreements 
with some European countries regarding the South Stream project. Thus 
Gazprom made a lot of efforts to find a sound compromise between EU and 
Russian legal rules of business; while the EU promoted its firm position that any 
onshore pipelines via EU countries such as Bulgaria, Hungary and Austria must 
comply with TEP rules. Nevertheless Gazprom continued debates on legal 
matters until all discussions were overwhelmed by 2014 geopolitical events in 
Ukraine. We may assume that Gazprom could reach a certain compromise with 
the EU if the February Ukraine Revolution had not happened.  
 
For Russia, a crunch point was reached when the origin of TEP disputes were 
weighted down by the Ukraine-Russia war disputes and following US and EU 
political and economic sanctions. I think mainly driving by anger and that EU 
does not have a single opinion on certain matters Russia reoriented its gas 
Strategy towards securing Turkish gas market. It is important to mention that 
Turkey did not support US and EU sanctions against Russia despite the fact that 
it aimed to become a member of the EU. I think it was politically right decision 
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for Turkey not to spoil warm relations with Russia. According to Gazprom’s 
official web site (2015) Turkey is Gazproms’s second largest sales market behind 
Germany. Gazprom supplied Turkey with 27.4 bcm of natural gas in 2014. 
Eventually on December 1 Gazprom and Turkey signed the agreement on 
constructing an offshore gas pipeline across the Black Sea to Turkey. Thus, 
currently Russia aims to secure gas supply to Turkey directly without transit 
interruptions (not via Ukraine) and with the following possible supplies to south-
east Europe by the means of the new Turkish Stream.  
 
Gazprom intends to build Turkish gas pipeline with capacity of 63 bcm, with 
nearly 50 bcm to be conveyed to a gas hub on the border between Turkey and 
Greece (Gazprom, 2015). 
 
 
4.3.2 Analysis of Transformation  
 
Logically it was in the EU’s interests to conduct a constructive dialogue with 
Russia concerning the implementation of the South Stream project especially 
after closure of the Nabucco one and the numerous gas crises. Instead the main 
European view on the South Stream Project was rather negative than positive, 
excluding several countries like Hungary, Bulgaria which could gain from mutual 
cooperation. The EU‘s behavior could be explained rather by the fear of Russian 
dominance in the EU market or by political antipathy due to confrontation with 
Ukraine and annexation of Crimea.  
 
On the one hand the cancellation of the project could be seen as a small victory 
for the EU which was firm on its TEP rules. On the other hand Russia will 
continue to supply gas but on its own terms. In my opinion Russia showed its 
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political and economic power and ability to remain calm and not respond to EU’s 
regulatory impediments and economic sanctions.  
 
Thus the closure of the South Stream project entailed a significant change in 
Russia’s Energy Strategy and relations with the EU. Gazprom left behind its initial 
plans of direct supplies to end users via territory the of the EU countries. Lack of 
mutual agreement within the EU forced Russia revise its policy towards new 
possible markets and opening new routes. 
 
The dramatic change in Russian energy policy could be risky for the EU and it 
should be Europe that is more worried than Russia. Gazprom was quick to 
reduce its dependency on European market by boosting energy cooperation with 
China and Turkey.  
 
On May 21, 2014 Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation 
signed the Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Russian gas supply via 
the eastern route. The 30-year contract provides for gas supplies in the 
amount of 38 billion cubic meters of gas per year. (Gazprom, 2015) 
 
Russia’s reorientation towards trading on hubs instead of deliveries to end 
consumers via the Turkish stream may improve Gazprom’s bargaining position as 
a low cost producer with vast gas resources close to Europe. And it unlikely that 
gas demand in Europe will fall within the next decades. Furthermore, the initial 
constructions of the South Stream can be reoriented for Turkish stream in what 
could be a real payoff for Gazprom. Turkish Stream seems to be a more 
economically rational project rather than simply a political one.  
 
This case study reveals a significant change in EU-Russia energy relations. 
Current EU-Russia relations present more straightforwardly commercial relations 
and not any more a strategic partnership as it used to be. However, the case is 
ongoing and changes in the EU-Russia energy relationship may happen any time.  
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Conclusions 
At the beginning of the thesis I intended to answer several research questions: 
Is Russia and its gas projects an answer to European Energy Security? What is 
the role of Ukraine and geopolitics in Energy Security? What are the prospects of 
the EU’s Energy Security diversification? Analysis of the current state of the EU-
Russia energy relations shows that it is very difficult to answer the first question 
positively. The positive answer is possible only in case of constructive mutual 
cooperation between counterparts. Who is to blame - Russia or the EU? It is 
clear that both Russia and the EU are highly interdependent in terms of energy 
security, and mutual cooperation could increase their level of energy stability. 
Until recently Russia promoted its strategic relationship with the EU, trying to 
serve both its own and the EU’s interests. But was the EU open to this strategic 
alliance? Even though the EU conducted the Energy Dialogue with Russia to 
enhance its energy security, the EU Commission constantly tried to eliminate 
Russia as a market player. Only few EU member states were showed their 
interest in constructive energy relations. Case studies show that the EU was not 
able to be productive in terms of its energy security diversification. The “Nabucco 
case” evidences the EU’s inability to be a credible actor in the region, defend its 
interests. The EU may rely on TAP as an alternative source but as was discussed 
earlier there is no guarantee that it will be constructed in time and can meet 
whole gas demand of the EU. And it seems that the current Greek government 
will try to build warm relations with Russia rather than serve the EU’s interests, 
and consequently would not be so interested in the TAP project. Through the 
cooperation with Russia Greece may improve its economic situation.  
 
But even if the EU had been more successful in implementing its energy strategy 
it could be difficult, if not impractical, to consider replacing all Russian natural 
gas imports. Russia is the principal EU supplier with a 32 % share of total natural 
gas imports which could hardly be immediately substituted.  
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I think that the major issue for the EU in developing a more effective Energy 
policy is absence of mutual understanding between the EU members. EU energy 
security starts with having a common vision. There is a fundamental conflict 
between the goals of energy security and the desire to create a competitive 
market - without centralized coordination. Thus, the energy security is likely to 
be difficult to achieve without a balanced energy policy within the Union. The 
dissidence in the EU is especially evident when it comes the levels of gas 
dependency of each EU member state.  
 
Besides it is very important to understand the role of geopolitics in the energy 
sector. Energy relations are not simply economic. The case study on the South 
Stream project demonstrates that sometimes geopolitics plays a crucial role in 
countries’ activities and decisions. Russia understands that it is hardly possible to 
conduct effective political and commercial relations with Kiev there for it stays 
firm on its strategy to diversify new gas routs bypassing Ukraine. From this point 
of view Russia seems to be more effective in securing its energy policy. Russia 
was quick to agree on gas supplies to China and build relations with Turkey. This 
reorientation to new markets decreases Russia’s dependence on the EU gas 
market. Thus it is the EU that should be more worried than Russia. It is in the 
EU’s interests to promote a respectful relationship towards Russia due to its high 
dependency level. The EU should be more careful in building gas relations with 
Russia. The Turkish Stream could be an option for the EU to mitigate the transit 
risks and by this means increase its energy security level. The power play goes 
on and the future of any gas project is not clear. But it is clear that Russia made 
a significant shift to more commercially-based relations with the EU. I believe 
that geopolitics would always define energy relations thus the EU should try to 
restore its “strategic partnership” with Russia.  
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Figure 1.  Gas Demand by Region, 2006-2030. Source: International Gas Union 
(2009), p.20. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  World primary energy consumption.  ERI and RAS forecast for 2010 -
2040. Source: ERI RAS, ACRF, 2013, p 98. 
 
